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Obligation without Rule: Bartleby, Agamben, and the Second-Person Standpoint 
 
 In Herman Melville’s Bartleby, the Scrivener: A Story of Wall-Street, the 
anonymous narrator finds himself involved in a kind of moral relation whose sense he 
finds very difficult to articulate. The narrator, a lawyer, had recently enjoyed a large 
increase in his business and so had hired a third scrivener, Bartleby, to help with the 
additional work. At first, Bartleby produced an extraordinary quantity of work, copying 
documents day and night. But things began to change on the third day when the lawyer 
made a routine request of his new scrivener: summoned to help proofread his own work, 
Bartleby informed the lawyer that he “would prefer not to.” In the following weeks, it 
became clear that Bartleby would prefer not to do any of the work he had been hired to 
do. The lawyer, it seems, would have been well within his right not to tolerate this 
behavior. But from the moment Bartleby first declared his preference not to proofread the 
documents, the lawyer understood himself as standing in some kind of relation with him 
that made it appear morally impermissible to dismiss him. Throughout the story, the 
lawyer experimented with different moral vocabularies to try to comprehend what was at 
stake in this relation, but none of these quite made sense of his conviction. Perhaps this 
should be taken as evidence that the lawyer was mistaken, that he in fact had no morally 
compelling reason to continue to take care of Bartleby. But I would like in this paper to 
pursue the possibility that the lawyer was not entirely mistaken. In what follows, I will 
argue that we can understand the lawyer’s relation to Bartleby, up to a certain point, in 
terms of Stephen Darwall’s influential account of the phenomenon of obligation. But I 
will also argue that there is a dimension of moral sense in the relation that is foreign to 
the phenomenon of obligation as Darwall understands it. Specifically, I want to argue that 
what is brought out in the relation between Bartleby and the lawyer is the separation of 
the experience of moral necessitation from the rule that would give its content. I will 
conclude by arguing that this obligation without rule is a genuine moral phenomenon and 
that we can begin to understand it in terms of the ideas of love, singularity, and 
potentiality as these are developed in the work of Giorgio Agamben. 
 
I. Obligation and the Second-Person Standpoint 
 
 According to the influential account articulated by Stephen Darwall in The 
Second-Person Standpoint, obligation is an irreducibly second-personal phenomenon. 
What this means, most fundamentally, is that obligation arises only within intersubjective 
relationships in which persons engage with each other as “self-originating sources of 
valid claims” (Rawls 1980, 543). These claims are to be understood not epistemically, as 
propositions purporting to state how the world truly is, but rather morally, as demands or 
claims addressed directly to the will of another. In genuinely second-personal 
relationships, the participants recognize each other as authorized to address these claims 
and recognize themselves as answerable to them. This means that the mere fact that a 
person has addressed a claim against one gives one a reason to act in accordance with the 
claim, completely independent of any reasons for action that one might already have had. 
Darwall provides a helpful example of this kind of second-personal authority near the 
	 2	
very beginning of The Second-Person Standpoint: suppose that someone has stepped on 
my foot, thereby causing me pain and inconvenience, and that I would like the person to 
move his foot and put it down somewhere else. One way I might go about trying to 
convince him is by getting him to see that there are reasons to which he is already 
committed that count in favor of his moving his foot. For example, if I know that he is a 
hedonistic utilitarian, I might tell him that his stepping on my foot brings about a world 
with a lower net total of happiness than the one that would be brought about if he moved 
his foot. In this case, I do not engage with the man second-personally, presenting myself 
to him as a self-originating source of valid claims. The only kind of authority I present 
myself as having is epistemic: I claim to have knowledge of the different states of the 
world that would be produced by the man’s moving or not moving his foot. In describing 
these different states, I appeal to reasons for action that he already has. The other way I 
could proceed would be to assert my authority to demand that the man move his foot. 
Here the authority I claim is not epistemic at all: I do not present myself as having a bit of 
knowledge, moral or otherwise, that the other person either lacks or needs to be reminded 
of. The authority I claim, rather, is simply the authority to demand that he respect me, 
that he act toward me only in ways that are justifiable to me, second-personally, and not 
merely in terms of agent-neutral principles and values. It is only in this second-personal 
kind of relationship that the phenomenon of obligation arises. In asserting my claim 
against the man, I am not merely trying to get him to acknowledge that moving his foot 
would be the best course of action, all things considered. Rather, I am trying to make him 
recognize that he owes it to me to move his foot and that he wrongs me if he does not 
(Darwall 2006, 5-10). 
 When we address second-personal reasons to each other, Darwall thinks, we 
commit ourselves to various normative presuppositions (Darwall 2006, 82). Unpacking 
these presuppositions will help to clarify what obligation is and how it differs from 
neighboring practical concepts. First, second-personal reason-giving presupposes 
relations of mutual respect. When we address others second-personally, we summon 
them to determine their own wills on the basis of the reasons we give them. In so doing, 
we respect them as free beings with the right rationally to determine their own wills. By 
proposing reasons for action, we renounce the strategy of determining others’ wills 
through deception, rhetorical trickery, or brute force. And in taking our proposed reasons 
seriously, considering them as bases for the determination of their own wills, others 
respect us as free, rational beings with the standing to address claims (Darwall 2006, 20-
22). In sum, then, engaging with each other from within the second-person standpoint 
commits us to recognizing that “free and rational persons have a dignity or authority in 
common to address (and be addressed) second-personal reasons” (Darwall 2006, 21). The 
second presupposition to which the second-person standpoint commits us is that those to 
whom we address claims are capable of holding themselves responsible for the 
determination of their own wills. Darwall refers to this as Pufendorf’s Point, as it 
develops an important insight first articulated by the early modern natural law theorist 
Samuel Pufendorf in his On the Law of Nature and of Nations and in On the Duty of Man 
and Citizen According to Natural Law. When we make a demand, Pufendorf thinks, we 
presuppose that our addressee is capable of addressing those same demands to herself. If 
our addressee were incapable of taking our reasons as principles for the determination of 
her own will—that is, if she could not adopt the second-person standpoint in relation to 
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herself—then she would have no experience of obligation. She would have no sense, in 
other words, of her will as being bound by principles that she herself accepts as 
legitimate. To be obligated, on Darwall’s account, is to hold oneself accountable to others 
and to their justified claims. A person who could not hold herself accountable in this way 
could be coerced, cajoled, tricked, or simply overpowered, but she could not be obligated 
(Darwall 2006, 22-25). 
 These presuppositions that are built into second-personal relations point in the 
direction of a contractualist conception of the content of obligation. According to 
Darwall, whenever we “attempt to hold anyone accountable by addressing second-
personal reasons of any kind, we presuppose that the authority and principles we 
implicitly invoke are ones our addressee can be expected to accept, or not reasonably to 
reject, as a free and rational agent who is apt for second-personal address” (Darwall 2006, 
300-301). If I genuinely respect another’s dignity as a free and rational agent, then I 
cannot reasonably demand that he pursue a given course of action simply on the grounds 
that I want him to. The attitude of one who would make such a demand is self-conceit, 
which Immanuel Kant characterized as a “lack of modesty in one’s claims to be respected 
by others” (Kant 1996, 579). Darwall describes this attitude as “a fantasy about second-
personal status. It is the conceit that one has a normative standing that others don’t have 
to dictate reasons just because of who or what one is” (Darwall 2006, 135). Such an 
attitude is incompatible with the presuppositions of good-faith participation in second-
personal relations. What mutual respect within the second-person standpoint demands is 
that I hold others accountable not to my own preferences but rather to principles that they 
could not reasonably reject. And in order to determine whether or not a principle is 
reasonably rejectable, I must adopt a second-personal relation to myself, asking myself 
whether I would be willing to determine my own will in accordance with the principle. 
The content of my obligation then, according the contractualist account entailed by the 
presuppositions of the second-person standpoint, is whatever the moral community could 
justifiably demand that I do. 
 
II. Bartleby and the Presuppositions of the Second-Person Standpoint 
 
 What I would like to argue in this section is that we can begin to make sense of 
the lawyer’s moral confusion by understanding his relationship to Bartleby in terms of 
the second-person standpoint and of the contractualist account of obligation that it 
supports. Specifically, I want to show that the lawyer’s confusion arises from the fact that 
he takes on all of the normative presuppositions of the second-person standpoint in his 
relations to Bartleby, but that Bartleby does not take on those presuppositions in his 
relations to the lawyer. Throughout the story, the lawyer presents himself to Bartleby as a 
maker of claims the legitimacy of which he is prepared to justify. At no point does the 
lawyer evince an attitude of self-conceit, demanding that the employees in the office 
respect his will simply on the grounds that it is his will. He does not attempt to overpower 
his employees or trick them into carrying out his will. Rather, he addresses claims to 
them that he takes to be supported by his legitimate authority as their employer and 
remains open to reasons addressed by his employees to him. For example, the second 
time that Bartleby indicates his preference not to proofread some documents, the lawyer 
supports his demand that he do so with reference to well established norms: “Every 
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copyist is bound to help examine his copy. Is it not so?” And when Bartleby states once 
again that he would prefer not to proofread the documents, the lawyer asks, “You are 
decided, then, not to comply with my request—a request made according to common 
usage and common sense” (Melville 1987, 22)? Later, when Bartleby tells him that he 
would prefer not to answer any questions about his past, the lawyer responds in a way 
that expresses respect for Bartleby’s second-personal competence: “But what reasonable 
objection can you have to speak to me” (Melville 1987, 30)? And when Bartleby refuses 
to leave the office after having been dismissed, the lawyer asks, “What earthly right do 
you have to stay here” (Melville 1987, 35)? In all of these examples, the lawyer attempts 
to relate to Bartleby under conditions of mutual accountability: he provides reasons 
supporting the legitimacy of his demands and he invites Bartleby to provide reasons 
justifying his own conduct. What is more, the demands that he addresses to Bartleby 
seem to satisfy the contractualist criterion of justifiability: it is hard to see how Bartleby 
could reasonably reject the principle according to which he ought to do the copying and 
proofreading that he was being paid to do. In sum, the lawyer regards Bartleby as 
obligated to act in accordance with his demands, but he also regards himself as obligated 
to make himself accountable to Bartleby. 
 Bartleby, on the other hand, takes up the second-person standpoint in relation to 
the lawyer only to a minimal degree. He does not address demands to the lawyer, 
insisting on any kind of right not to do his work. Indeed, he does not even try to give the 
lawyer reasons to believe that his refusal to work is excusable. All he says is that he 
would prefer not to do the things the lawyer asks him to do. This is true even in those 
cases where the lawyer explicitly asks Bartleby to make himself accountable. When 
asked, for example, what objection he could have to answering the lawyer’s questions 
about his past, Bartleby says, “At present I prefer to give no answer” (Melville 1987, 30). 
When asked what right he had to remain in the lawyer’s office after having been 
dismissed, Bartleby gives no answer at all (Melville 1987, 35). And when the lawyer 
implores him to be reasonable in responding to his demands, Bartleby expresses as 
clearly as possible his reluctance to take up the second-person standpoint, informing the 
lawyer that he “would prefer not to be a little bit reasonable” (Melville 1987, 30). 
Nonetheless, the lawyer never abandons the second-person standpoint in his 
relation to Bartleby. He continues to treat Bartleby’s statements as if they were demands 
or justifying reasons, and as a result he continues to regard himself as accountable to him. 
At first, the lawyer seems to believe that he owes it to Bartleby not to dismiss him, 
despite the fact that he had made it very clear that he was not going to do any copying or 
proofreading. Later, after having moved into a new office and leaving Bartleby behind, 
the lawyer apparently views himself as duty-bound to try to find him a new occupation 
and new place to live. In both of these cases, it is clear that the lawyer does not view his 
beneficence toward Bartleby as supererogatory. Neither does he view his acts as merely 
permissible. He seems to view himself, rather, as obligated to take care of Bartleby. For 
example, after having resolved to dismiss Bartleby for refusing to reveal anything about 
his personal history, the lawyer experiences an attack of conscience: “...I strangely felt 
something superstitious knocking at my heart, and forbidding me to carry out my 
purpose, and denouncing me for a villain if I dared to breathe one bitter word against this 
forlornest of mankind” (Melville 1987, 30). Later, when Bartleby’s strange behavior 
began to damage the lawyer’s professional reputation, he strategizes about ways to rid 
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himself of Bartleby. But again, he clearly regards his options as being limited by the 
stringent obligations he owes to the scrivener: “What shall I do? what ought I to do? what 
does conscience say I should do with this man, or rather ghost?” After considering the 
option of thrusting him out the door, the lawyer quickly recognizes the moral 
impermissibility of such a cruel act: “No, I will not, I cannot do that” (Melville, 1987, 
38). And finally, after having offered to secure new employment for Bartleby, the lawyer 
feels as if he had done everything he could “with regard to [his] own desire and sense of 
duty, to benefit Bartleby, and shield him from rude persecution” (Melville 1987, 42). 
 The lawyer’s understanding of his obligation to Bartleby does not seem to make 
sense in terms of the second-personal account developed by Darwall. In none of the 
different cases does the purported obligation pass the reasonable rejectability test. 
Without a doubt a person could reasonably reject the principle according to which he 
must continue to employ someone who has stopped doing the work he was hired to do, 
who does not even provide any excuse for not working, and who has given every 
indication that he will not start doing the work again anytime in the near future. And 
certainly one could reasonably reject the principle according to which one must seek out 
new employment opportunities and new living arrangements for a former employee who 
refuses to leave the premises. Moreover, I believe we would arrive at the same results 
without explicitly applying the reasonable rejectability test, relying simply on the pre-
theoretical moral intuitions that contractualism formalizes: I suspect that most people, if 
they were in the lawyer’s position, would regard themselves as fully justified not only in 
firing Bartleby but also in calling the police to have him forcefully evicted.  
Why, then, does the lawyer experience himself as obligated to Bartleby in these 
ways? At various points in the story, he tries out different practical vocabularies in order 
to try to make sense of his moral experience, but none of these seem especially plausible. 
Near the beginning of the story, the lawyer tries to make sense of his unwillingness to 
dismiss Bartleby in straightforwardly prudential terms: “He is useful to me. I can get 
along with him.” If he were to turn Bartleby out, he might end up with another employer 
who would treat him much less indulgently. Indeed, he might be driven to unemployment 
and eventually to starvation. By retaining Bartleby, then, the lawyer “can cheaply 
purchase a delicious self-approval. To befriend Bartleby; to humor him in his strange 
wilfulness, will cost [him] little or nothing...” (Melville 1987, 23). But as the story 
continues, it becomes increasingly clear that Bartleby is not useful to the lawyer at all, 
and that he is in fact a liability. Later, after Bartleby has refused to leave the office after 
having been dismissed, the lawyer arrives at the conclusion that he had been assigned by 
God the task of caring for Bartleby: “Gradually I slid into the persuasion that these 
troubles of mine touching the scrivener, had been all predestined from eternity, and 
Bartleby was billeted upon me for some mysterious purpose of an all-wise Providence, 
which it was not for a mere mortal like me to fathom” (Melville 1987, 37). But the 
lawyer seems not to have held this view very sincerely, since he abandoned it just as soon 
as his scrivener’s strange behavior began to adversely affect his reputation among other 
lawyers within the community.  
Perhaps the best explanation of the lawyer’s experience is simply that he is 
mistaken, that he misunderstands the nature of the relation in which he stands to Bartleby 
and that he therefore misunderstands the moral requirements that issue from that relation. 
Most importantly, he wrongly believes that Bartleby is second-personally competent: he 
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interprets Bartleby’s words as claims that he is willing to support with reasons and he 
trusts that Bartleby is willing to determine his own will in accordance with valid claims 
addressed by others. For the most part, the lawyer does not adopt toward Bartleby what 
P.F. Strawson calls the objective attitude, suspending the engaged, interpersonal 
relationship and viewing him third-personally as an object “to be managed or handled or 
cured or trained” (Strawson 2008, 9). The lawyer’s commitment to treating Bartleby as a 
full partner to second-personal interaction, and not merely as an object to be managed, is 
brought out especially clearly when he becomes angry at Bartleby for refusing to disclose 
any information about his personal history. From the lawyer’s point of view, Bartleby 
“seemed ungrateful, considering the undeniable good usage and indulgence he had 
received from [him]” (Melville 1987, 30). Gratefulness, in Strawson’s terms, is a reactive 
attitude: it makes sense to expect it from another only within the context of a second-
personal relation. But why does the lawyer expect Bartleby to be grateful? And more 
generally, why does he continue to engage with Bartleby second-personally, taking on all 
the normative presuppositions of that kind of relationship, even as the evidence comes to 
suggest more and more strongly that the objective attitude would be more appropriate? I 
believe Strawson’s account of the reactive attitudes in “Freedom and Resentment” is once 
again helpful here. Generally speaking, he argues, it is difficult for human beings to step 
outside the participant attitude; we can do so when we deal with young children or with 
the mentally ill, or when we try as philosophers or social scientists to formulate theories 
about the human world, but we typically cannot sustain the objective attitude for very 
long (Strawson 2008, 10). This is almost certainly true within an office environment of 
the kind depicted in Bartleby, the Scrivener, which is structured through and through by 
norms and expectations whose second-personal validity is simply taken for granted. 
Perhaps, then, the lawyer’s confusion regarding his obligations toward Bartleby can be 
attributed to the difficulty that human beings generally have in stepping outside the 
second-person standpoint, even in cases where the evidence suggests that it would be 
appropriate to do so. 
 
III. Love as Comportment toward Being-such 
 
 I do not believe this is quite right, though. Specifically, I do not believe the 
lawyer’s understanding of the moral relation that obtains between him and Bartleby is 
completely mistaken. In order to show how this is the case, I want to argue in this section 
that there is a moral phenomenon, which I will call obligation without rule, that arises in 
the midst of second-personal relations and that is not entirely captured in Darwall’s 
contractualist conception of obligation, or indeed in any of the accounts of obligation that 
have been most prominent in the history of western philosophy from the early modern 
period up to the present. More specifically, I will attempt to show how others are given, 
or at least can be given, within the second-person standpoint as something more than 
addressors of determinate claims in accordance with which addressees are summoned 
freely to determine their own wills. I will argue that we can begin to make sense of this 
with the help of Giorgio Agamben’s ideas of potentiality, singularity, being-such, and 
love. 
 In order to bring out this excessive dimension of moral sense that arises within the 
second-person standpoint, I would like to begin by examining more closely what happens 
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in the various exchanges between the lawyer and Bartleby. What I want to show is that 
although the two do in some sense exchange roles as addressor and addressee of claims, 
they do so in a way that differs in important respects from the model that Darwall 
describes. Specifically, I want to argue that what Bartleby addresses to the lawyer is both 
less and more than a demand. First, what Bartleby addresses to the lawyer does not quite 
rise to the level of a demand because, as we have seen, Bartleby never explicitly calls on 
the lawyer to respect his right not to copy or proofread the documents. Nor does he 
present the lawyer with any reasons to excuse his not doing the work. Instead, he simply 
announces his preference not to. This is still a form of address, but it is a minimal form. 
When he responds to the lawyer’s demands with his “I would prefer not to,” Bartleby 
seems not to treat the lawyer as a second-personally competent partner in dialogue, 
providing reasons that might come to function as principles in the lawyer’s determination 
of his own will. Instead, he seems simply to be giving a report of his own psychological 
state. Nonetheless, Bartleby’s announcements of his psychological state always happen 
within a situation that is structured second-personally, most often in response to claims 
that the lawyer has explicitly addressed to him. Probably as a result of this, the lawyer 
typically treats Bartleby’s “I would prefer not to” as a kind of poorly formed second-
personal demand. Indeed, the other workers in the office eventually pick up the habit of 
using the word “prefer,” which they come to use in a sense that is straightforwardly 
second personal. For example, at one point the lawyer tells his employee Turkey to leave 
the room, to which he responds “Oh certainly, sir, if you prefer that I should” (Melville 
1987, 31). Shortly after this, Nippers asks the lawyer whether he would prefer to have a 
document copied on blue or white paper. In both of these cases, the employees clearly 
take the lawyer’s preferences as legitimate demands. But Bartleby does not seem to treat 
his own preferences as demands addressed to the lawyer, even though they end up 
functioning as such. It seems, then, that Bartleby’s announcements of his preference are 
best understood as something more than mere expressions of his own psychological state 
but as something less than full-fledged second-personal demands. 
 But there is also something more than a demand that is expressed in Bartleby’s 
address to the lawyer. And it is here where I would like to turn explicitly to the work of 
Giorgio Agamben, for whom Bartleby has consistently served as a privileged point of 
reference. For Agamben, Bartleby is an exemplar of “pure, absolute potentiality” 
(Agamben 1999, 254). Agamben establishes a connection between writing—Bartleby’s 
profession—and potentiality through his reading of the well known passage in On the 
Soul where Aristotle suggests that thought is like “a writing-table on which as yet nothing 
actually stands written” (Aristotle 1984, 683). The writing tablet—or more precisely, the 
thin layer of wax that covered the tablet and that received the impressions of the stylus—
could receive any written content at all precisely because of its blankness, its lack of 
determinate form. The value of this analogy is that it helps to bring out an essential 
feature of thought: if thought itself had some particular content, then that content would 
manifest itself in the objects of thought, distorting our cognition of them. This is why it is 
necessary to conceive of the mind as having “no nature of its own, other than that of 
having a certain capacity,” such that “before it thinks, [it is] not actually any real thing” 
(Aristotle 1984, 682). But as Agamben emphasizes, it is important not to understand this 
potential as a merely logical possibility for different actualizations. Rather, if potentiality 
is to be understood on its own terms, if it “is to have its own consistency and not always 
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disappear immediately into actuality, it is necessary that potentiality be able not to pass 
over into actuality, that potentiality constitutively be the potentiality not to (do or be) or, 
as Aristotle says, that potentiality be also im-potentiality (adynamia)” (Agamben 1998, 
44-45). Returning to Aristotle’s analogy, then, the writing tablet is capable of being 
written on, but just as importantly, it is capable of not being written on. It can pass into 
various actualizations, but it can also not pass into those actualizations. As a scrivener 
who represents a figure of “pure, absolute potentiality,” Bartleby is capable of actualizing 
his potential to write at any time he chooses, but he retains his pure potentiality precisely 
in preferring not to. Agamben’s interpretation of Bartleby as a figure of im-potentiality is 
supported by the scrivener’s responses to the lawyer’s efforts to find him a new job. 
Every time the lawyer brings up a possible line of work, Bartleby indicates that he would 
prefer not to pursue that possibility, but insists nonetheless that he is “not particular.” 
Offered the possibility of a clerkship in a dry goods store, Bartleby declares that there is 
“too much confinement about that.” Of course the lawyer immediately notes the irony of 
Bartleby’s response: “‘Too much confinement’ I cried, ‘why you keep yourself confined 
all the time’” (Melville 1987, 41)! The point, it seems, is that Bartleby would experience 
any kind of actualization at all as too confining. What the lawyer demands of Bartleby, 
though, is precisely that he actualize his potential to write. For Bartleby, to respond to the 
lawyer from within the second-person standpoint would be to commit himself to 
reasonable principles for the determination of his own will, and thus to actualizing a 
potential, to being a scrivener, or an employee, or at very least a second-personally 
competent, reasonable and rational person. But this is exactly what Bartleby would prefer 
not to do. Again, this is the point that Bartleby makes especially clearly when he states 
that he “would prefer not to be a little bit reasonable.” 
 With his “I would prefer not to,” then, Bartleby gives expression to a sense that 
exceeds what can be captured in the form of a demand. On the one hand, he is obviously 
not affirming his acceptance of the legitimacy of the lawyer’s demand or his resolution to 
determine his will in accordance with it. But neither, on the other hand, is he denying the 
legitimacy of the lawyer’s demand or expressing his refusal to determine his will in 
accordance with it. This point becomes especially clear when the lawyer, frustrated with 
Bartleby’s “I would prefer not to,” asks for clarification: “You will not?” Bartleby 
responds, “I prefer not” (Melville 1987, 25). What Bartleby is giving expression to is 
neither an affirmation nor a refusal, but rather a potentiality whose sense exceeds these 
two actualizations. According to Agamben, we can understand this excess in terms of the 
ancient Sceptics’ idea of epoché or suspension of judgment. Confronted with the equal 
force or equipollence of reasons for believing competing claims, the Sceptic refrains from 
committing himself to the truth of any one of them. This suspension of judgment is 
expressed in the phrase ou mallon, or “no more than.” Confronted with the fact, for 
example, that honey appears sweet to some and bitter to others, the Sceptic states that 
“honey is no more sweet than bitter” (Sextus Empiricus 2000, 54-55). This statement 
should not be taken as expressing a determinate belief about the honey, viz. that it is 
neither sweet nor bitter. It functions rather to express the speaker’s suspension of 
judgment on the matter. In suspending his judgment, the Sceptic exercises his potentiality 
not to posit or negate. According to Agamben, Bartleby’s “I would prefer not to” 
functions similarly. Like the Sceptic, Bartleby “displaces language from the register of 
the proposition, which predicates something of something…to that of the announcement, 
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which predicates nothing of nothing” (Agamben 1999, 257). He presents himself as no 
more a scrivener than not a scrivener, no more “a little bit reasonable” than not “a little 
bit reasonable.” In short, he presents himself as something more than a member of this or 
that class and as more than the bearer of this or that set of properties. What becomes 
manifest here is neither particularity nor universality, but rather Bartleby’s singularity or 
what Agamben calls his being-such, the dimension of his presentation that remains 
irreducible to the determinate sense of that presentation (Agamben 1993, 2). 
 According to Agamben, the comportment that responds to this being-such is not 
obligation, but rather love. Building on the account of facticity developed in the early 
works of Martin Heidegger, Agamben argues that the comportment of love arises at the 
level of our being-in-the-world, which is more originary than the cognitive relation of 
intentionality that obtains between subject and object (Agamben 1999, 186-187). In love, 
Agamben thinks, we are not oriented toward objects that are present to us primarily as 
bearers of determinate predicates; we do not love others qua members of this or that 
class—the class of brunettes, for example, or of persons who enjoy going to the opera—
but neither is our love directed toward the unqualified selves who would somehow stand 
behind these properties. What we love, rather, is a singularity, the other “with all of its 
predicates, its being such as it is” (Agamben 1993, 2). Or as Agamben puts the point in 
The Time that Remains, “‘I love beautiful-brunette-tender Mary,’ not ‘I love Mary 
because she is beautiful, brunette, tender’ in the sense of her possessing such and such an 
attribute” (Agamben 2005, 128). And so unlike obligation, or at least unlike obligation as 
Darwall conceives it, “love is without reason” (Agamben 2005, 128). There is no 
analogue to Pufendorf’s Point here: we are not answerable to demands for our love that 
are addressed to us as rational beings capable of determining our own wills in accordance 
with principles whose legitimacy can be determined by reference to something like the 
reasonable rejectability test. And we do not owe it to ourselves as rational beings only to 
love those who have satisfied a particular set of conditions. Love is unconstrained by 
considerations like these; it is gratuitous, granted to the loved one simply in virtue of her 
being such as she is. 
 Would it be best, then, to characterize the lawyer’s practical relation to Bartleby 
not within the framework of obligation and the second-person standpoint, but rather in 
terms of love? There are certainly good reasons in the text for thinking so. For example, 
after the first episode of Bartleby’s preferring not to do the work demanded of him, the 
lawyer stated that if it had been anyone else, he would have dismissed him immediately, 
but that “there was something about Bartleby that not only strangely disarmed [him], but 
in a wonderful manner touched and disconcerted [him]” (Melville 1987, 21). This is not 
how we typically describe relations of obligation, understood either in the rough, 
everyday sense of the term or in Darwall’s more specific sense. What the lawyer 
responds to here is something singular and therefore strange, something in excess of the 
determinate, interpersonally valid norms that would have oriented his relations with any 
other employee. It is exactly this kind of responsiveness, according to Agamben, that 
characterizes relations of love.   
 We find a second piece of evidence in the passage in which the lawyer, after 
having moved out of his old office, offers to secure for Bartleby any other job he might 
want. When Bartleby indicates his preference not to take any of those jobs, the lawyer 
offers to take him in at his own home. And finally, after Bartleby is taken off to jail as a 
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vagrant, the lawyer pays the grub-man, Mr. Cutlets, to make sure he was fed more than 
the standard fare. Surely the lawyer was not morally obligated to do any of these things 
for Bartleby; no one could plausibly have considered him blameworthy if he had not done 
them, for in none of these cases could Bartleby or anyone else have advanced a claim that 
would have passed the reasonable rejectability test and that would have morally 
necessitated the lawyer to act as he did. In all of these cases, rather, it seems most natural 
to interpret the lawyer’s acts as free, rationally unconstrained acts of love. 
 
IV. The Experience of Necessitation and the Content of Obligation 
 
 But I do not believe this quite captures the moral complexities of the lawyer’s 
situation. Whether he ought to or not, he clearly does experience himself as being 
necessitated in a specifically moral sense. As we have already seen, after deliberating 
about how to go about removing Bartleby from his office, the lawyer concludes that he 
will not, and indeed cannot, simply thrust him out the door. The lawyer obviously does 
not mean by this that he is physically unable to thrust Bartleby out the door. What he 
means, rather, is that doing so is morally impossible. Whether he likes it or not, the 
lawyer finds his will constrained by the moral sense of the situation he finds himself in: 
even if no one else would think badly of him if he forcefully dismissed Bartleby from the 
office, it would be impossible for him to avoid viewing himself as blameworthy for doing 
so. This is what the lawyer means when he says that something inside him would 
denounce him as a villain if he mistreated Bartleby (Melville 1987, 30; 38). And it is this 
impossibility of avoiding the judgment of oneself as blameworthy that many moral 
philosophers have regarded as distinctive of the phenomenon of obligation. This idea is 
expressed perhaps most clearly in Samuel Pufendorf’s On the Law of Nature and of 
Nations, where he argues that the uniqueness of obligation consists in the fact that the 
sanction for wrongdoing is internal: in cases of mere coercion, the will is shaken only 
“with an external force,” whereas obligation “forces a man to acknowledge of himself” 
that the relevant moral rule applies to him justly and that he would be deserving of some 
kind of censure if he violated it (Pufendorf 1964, 91).1  
But of course it does not follow from the mere fact that the lawyer experiences 
himself as obligated to benefit Bartleby in certain specific ways that he truly is obligated 
to do so. The most important question from the moral point of view, rather, is whether his 
experience of his will as necessitated is justified, whether he ought to regard himself as 
blameworthy if he does not retain Bartleby, or if he does not go out of his way to find 
him a new job and a new home. I suspect that most of us, if we had known the lawyer, 
would have insisted that he should not have denounced himself as a villain, and indeed 
that he should not have regarded himself as deserving any kind of censure if he had not 
performed the acts of beneficence that he did. We probably would have regarded his acts 
not as obligatory but rather as supererogatory. Nonetheless, I believe the lawyer is not 																																																								
1 Christian Wolff, whose rationalist account of obligation differs considerably from Pufendorf’s voluntarist 
account, expresses a similar point: “Virtue can exist with natural obligation alone; everything beyond that 
works simply as an outer compulsion…. Accordingly, if one wants to guide man, one can do it in two 
ways: one guides him either through compulsion, like a beast, or through the aid of reason, like a 
reasonable creature. With the former I have, in ethics, nothing to do” (Wolff 1976, Vorrede zu der andern 
Auflage; Schneewind 2003, 333; 334). 
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entirely mistaken and that examining more closely the nature of his relation to Bartleby 
will help to bring out something important about the phenomenon of obligation that is not 
captured well, if at all, in the most influential accounts. Specifically, in spite of their 
deep-seated disagreements concerning the nature and the grounds of obligation, most of 
these accounts agree that the experience of necessitation is always given along with the 
content of the obligation. On the voluntarist account, for example, the command that is 
issued by a legitimate authority and effectively backed by sanctions is always a command 
to do or refrain from doing some determinate thing. A command without content could 
not obligate because it would fail to satisfy the condition that Darwall calls Pufendorf’s 
Point, viz., that the addressee of the command be able to take up the authoritative 
command and address it to himself. On rationalist accounts of the kind advanced by 
Leibniz, Malebranche, Clarke, and Wolff, the content of the obligation is given by the 
moral truths that we perceive clearly and distinctly. Because we perceive them clearly 
and distinctly, our minds cannot help assenting; this is the element of necessitation as the 
rationalists understand it (Malebranche 1992, 84; Malebranche 1997, 10).2 And on the 
Kantian account, the fact of reason is not merely the consciousness that our wills are 
necessitated, but rather our unmediated consciousness of the bindingness of the moral 
law, which of course gives the content of the obligation.  
What we see in the relation between Bartleby and the lawyer, though, is the 
coming apart of these two elements: the lawyer experiences himself as obligated toward 
Bartleby, but without the rule for that obligation being given. This, I believe, can be 
explained partly in terms of Darwall’s conception of the second-person standpoint. The 
interactions between Bartleby and the lawyer take place within an office environment 
where the norms and expectations connected to the second-person standpoint are for the 
most part taken for granted. And as Strawson argued in “Freedom and Resentment,” we 
find ourselves answerable to others just in virtue of taking up the second-person 
standpoint in relation to them. But the lawyer’s case is importantly different from the 
kinds of cases that Darwall takes to be exemplary of the second-person standpoint in that 
the other person to whom the lawyer finds himself answerable is given as something 
more than a maker of particular, determinate claims; what is most salient about Bartleby 
is his singularity. And this fact undermines what is perhaps the most important part of 
Pufendorf’s Point: although the obligated subject must be able to adopt the second-person 
standpoint in relation to himself, holding himself responsible to the moral sense that he 
receives as the addressee in second-personal relations with others, it is not necessarily the 
case that this moral sense can be articulated in terms of determinate demands whose 
authority the subject himself acknowledges. As we have seen, what the lawyer responds 
to is not any particular claim at all, but rather the manifestation of Bartleby’s singularity 
or being-such. No authoritative principle is given, then, for the determination of his will; 
there is no particular rule that he is rationally constrained to address to himself from the 
second-person standpoint. And yet he must respond to Bartleby in some particular way. 
As Bernhard Waldenfels has argued, this practical impossibility of not responding in 
some way or other is the source of the necessitation that is proper to the phenomenon of 
																																																								
2According to Malebranche, clear and distinct perceptions “oblige the will to give its consent;” we cannot 
refrain from giving our consent “without feeling an inward pain and the secret reproaches of reason.” 
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obligation (Waldenfels 2010, 78).3 The obligated subject, then, is in a position similar to 
that of the lover as described by Jacques Lacan: he “gives what he does not have, but 
what is nonetheless demanded of him” (Waldenfels 2010, 79; Waldenfels 1994, 620). 
The lawyer experiences himself as practically necessitated to do right by Bartleby, but he 
lacks the principle that would tell him how to do so. He lacks the principle precisely 
because qua singularity, Bartleby presents him with a moral sense that exceeds what can 
be captured in any determinate formulation. He is thus obligated without rule. If the 
lawyer is to respond appropriately to the excessive moral sense given in his second-
personal relation to Bartleby, all he can do is improvise responses that in each case 
disregard the kinds of intersubjectively valid rules—such as the reasonable rejectability 
test—that govern what purport to be the more standard cases of second-personal 
interaction.  
 The most influential accounts of obligation in the western philosophical tradition 
do not account well, if at all, for the kind of obligation without rule that is presented in 
Bartleby, the Scrivener. One might argue, of course, that this is not a problem for any of 
these moral theories: Bartleby is a work of fiction after all, and the interpersonal relations 
that Melville depicts simply do not correspond to the kinds of interactions that we are 
familiar with in everyday life. Perhaps the kind of obligation depicted in the story is not a 
genuine moral phenomenon that needs to be taken seriously at all. I do not believe this is 
correct. Although this is presented in an exaggerated form in Bartleby, all of us manifest 
a potentiality of sense that exceeds the sense that can be actualized in the determinate 
claims we make against others. And all of us stand unavoidably in second-personal 
relations in which we are called upon to respond appropriately to others’ sense. If this is 
right, and if it is true that the necessitation proper to the phenomenon of obligation has its 
origin in the necessity of responding, then I believe we must regard obligation without 
rule as a genuine phenomenon that an adequate moral philosophy must be able to account 
for. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																								
3 “We cannot not respond. The double ‘not’ points to a must in the sense of a practical necessity.” 
Translation mine.  
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